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Economic crisis and innovation: is destruction prevailing 
over accumulation? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2008 economic crisis has severely reduced the short-term willingness of firms to 
invest in innovation. But this reduction has not occurred uniformly and a few firms 
even increased their investment in spite of the adverse macroeconomic environment. 
This paper, based on the latest three waves of the UK Community Innovation Survey, 
compares drivers of innovation investment before and during the crisis. We find that 
the crisis led to a concentration of innovative activities among fast growing and 
already innovative firms. The companies in pursuit of more explorative strategies 
towards new product and market developments are those to cope better with the crisis.  
 
Key words: Economic crisis, innovation investment, Community Innovation Survey 
JEL classification: O12, O30, O52  
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1. Is the financial crisis bringing gales of creative destruction? 
 
The 2008 financial crisis has severely reduced the short-term willingness of 
companies to invest in innovation (OECD, 2009; Paunov, 2011). While on the whole 
firms’ investment in innovation declined during the economic downturn, a small but 
significant minority of firms are “swimming against the stream” and have increased 
their expenditures on innovation.
1
 Who are these firms that have decided to respond to 
the crisis by innovating more rather than less? There are two possible scenarios.  
(a) These firms are the most dynamic ones; those that cannot survive without 
changing their products and services. The competitive advantage of these firms 
resides in the generation and upgrading of new knowledge, and they innovate 
continuously, irrespectively of the business cycle. 
(b) Or, alternatively, these firms are new innovators that were not necessarily 
involved in innovation before the crisis. These firms might be smaller in size or 
entirely new firms that take advantage of the crisis to contest the market shares of 
incumbent firms or to launch fresh markets. 
Point (a) assumes that innovation and technical change are rooted in 
cumulative learning processes and path-dependent patterns that are woven into 
organizational routines. This brings persistence in innovative activities, and 
persistence, in turn, is led by well established firms (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Antonelli, 1997). Point (b) is based on the assumption that economic turbulence 
makes it possible for new and small firms to emerge in a competitive market through 
innovation (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Simonetti, 
1996; Freeman and Louca, 2001; Perez, 2002, 2009). 
As most insights in the field of innovation, points (a) and (b) derive from the 
theorising of Joseph A. Schumpeter. Schumpeter and his followers suggested that 
economic cycles are the consequence of innovation, but also that innovative activities 
and innovative organisations are re-shaped by economic crises. In particular, we 
interpret the canonical debate between the two models elaborated by the young and 
the old Schumpeter in the following way.
2
 During an upswing in the business cycle 
innovation is carried out in a cumulative fashion. Firms carry out innovation along 
established technological trajectories and develop into incumbents that accomplish 
innovation as a routine, also to prevent the entrance of newcomers (Schumpeter, 
1942; Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Following Pavitt et al. (1999) and Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1995), we call this process creative accumulation. An economic turmoil, on the 
contrary, generates a shakeout in established industries and technological fields; new 
firms in new sectors play a relatively bigger role than incumbent firms in generating 
innovations. New firms are eager to exploit new technological opportunities also as a 
way to challenge incumbent corporations; as the young Schumpeter suggested, “it is 
not the owner of the stage-coaches who builds railways” (Schumpeter, 1911), p. 66. 
Following Schumpeter, we call this process creative destruction.
3
 
                                                 
1
 For an analysis of the effect of the crisis at the country-level see (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011). 
2
 For an effective presentation of the innovation models presented by the young Schumpeter in his 
Theory of Economic Development (1911 (1934) and the old Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942), we draw on Freeman et al., (1982). Schumpeter’s monumental analysis of business 
cycles (1939) was published in between these two works. 
3
 The processes of creative destruction is widely described in Schumpeter’s Theory of Economics 
Development (Schumpeter, 1911 (1934)), although the term itself was used for the first time in his 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1942). Paradoxically, the book which introduced 
the term “creative destruction” vindicated instead the importance of creative accumulation. 
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These, Schumpeter’s insights have been largely enriched by the Neo-
Schumpeterian stream of research. Following Nelson and Winter (1982) and Dosi 
(1982), it emerged that there are important differences across technological regimes 
and industrial sectors (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995, 1997). The literature on the 
persistence of innovation, empirically supported by the analysis of patent data and 
innovation counts (Geroski et al., 1997; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001) and innovation 
survey data (Peters, 2007; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2008; Antonelli et al., 2010), 
somehow confirmed that there are several industries where the innovators of today 
were also innovators in the past. But on the whole this literature finds mixed evidence 
and shows that the cumulative and path-dependent nature of technical change is 
greater in those firms that (a) devote a substantial budget to R&D and innovation, (b) 
concentrate on product innovations, and (c) are large in terms of their size. 
There are also a number of recent empirical studies that explore firms’ 
innovative behaviour before and during economic recessions. Kanerva and Hollanders 
(2009), analysing Innobarometer data for Europe, find no association between firm 
size and decline in investment during 2008. Their results suggest that highly 
innovative firms continued to invest in innovation also during the downturn. Alvarez 
et al. (2010), in their analysis of Chilean manufacturing firms, explore firms’ 
responses to the financial crisis of 1998. They find a positive association between firm 
size and organisational innovations, but no impact of financial constraints on 
innovation performance during the crisis. In contrast, Antonioli et al. (2010), find that, 
in their analysis of firms located in Italy’s Emilia-Romagna, SMEs were more 
innovative compared with large firms during the recent crisis. In a firm-based study in 
eight Latin American countries, Paunov (2011) shows that the current crisis led many 
firms to stop ongoing innovation projects. The rising of financial constraint and the 
negative demand shock affected the decisions of firms to abandon innovation projects. 
Further, younger businesses supplying foreign multinationals or suffering export 
shocks were more likely to stop innovating. Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) explore 
firms’ innovation investment in Europe and find that (a) the crisis brings about a 
reduction in the willingness of firms to increase innovation investment and (b) strong 
National Systems of Innovation help firms to retain their invest in innovation. 
Thanks to a panel dataset we are able in this paper to explore firms’ innovation 
behaviour before and during the crisis. While there is a general consensus on the fact 
that the most innovative firms are also more likely to persist in innovating, we would 
like to explore a counter argument. On the one hand, firms with a more agile/flexible 
structure might take better advantage of changing environments and new market 
opportunities; on the other hand, firms in more established industries might suspend 
or abandon ongoing innovation projects to reduce costs. In other words, the unique 
environment of the current economic crisis might challenge innovation in a 
cumulative fashion and lead to an environment more closely related to creative 
destruction. It is possible, and indeed likely, that the innovators during the crisis differ 
from those investing before the crisis. This paper seeks to shed light on this issue by 
examining the following question: who are the innovators during the economic crisis 
compared to before the crisis? Answering this question would provide important 
clues for policy makers.  
We address this question by analysing a balanced panel of around 2,500 UK 
enterprises that responded to the last three waves of the UK version of the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS), thus covering for each enterprise the period 2002-2008. The 
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical framework and 
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develops the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the dataset and methodology. Section 4 
presents the results that are discussed in the last section. 
 
 
2. Is innovation the outcome of knowledge accumulation at the firm level or of 
the creative destruction in the economy? 
 
The concepts of technological accumulation and creative destruction are at the core of 
Schumpeter’s and Schumpeterian economics. The young Schumpeter looked at 
innovation as an event that could revolutionise economic life by brining into the fore 
new entrepreneurs, new companies and new industries. The mature Schumpeter, on 
the contrary, observed and described the activities of large, oligopolistic corporations, 
able to perform R&D and innovation as a routine activity by building on their 
previous competences. 
On the ground of these insights, the Schumpeterian tradition has further 
investigated the relative importance of the two processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Patel and Pavitt, 1994; Breschi et al., 2000). Creative destruction is a regime of low 
cumulativeness and high technological opportunities, where entry and exit in 
technological areas is easy. Competition among companies is fierce and the role 
played by entrepreneurial spirits is crucial. Creative accumulation is a regime with 
high technological cumulativeness and low opportunities, leading to a stable 
environment in which the bulk of innovation is carried out by large and established 
firms incrementally. The resulting market structure has high entry barriers and 
oligopolistic competition. 
Over the last decades this debate has been enriched by new theoretical 
developments and empirical research. The interest has shifted from a technological 
regime/industry-level to a micro-level. This is for two reasons. Firstly, there is 
increasing awareness that firm-level characteristics play a greater role in shaping 
innovation activity within technological areas and industries. Secondly, greater 
availability of micro-data, such as the CIS, has made it possible to investigate 
empirically firms’ heterogeneity in innovation related behaviour. Explorative 
empirical studies have shown that there is a great deal of variety in the way firms 
innovate within industries and within countries (Srholec and Verspagen, 2008; 
Evangelista and Vezzani, 2010; Frenz and Lambert, 2010). 
The focus of this paper is not on specific industries or technological regimes, 
but on how an exogenous shock, represented by the financial crisis, is affecting firm-
level innovation investment. The remainder of this section develops a set of firm-level 
determinants of innovation investment in the context of the financial crisis. These 
determinants are examined in view of the changes at the macro-level – before and 
during the economic downturn – as we aim to understand if, and, if so, through what 
channels, the economic crisis led to variations/discontinuities at the aggregate level. 
 
2.1 Creative destruction or firm level accumulation  
Those who support the ‘destruction/discontinuous hypothesis’ argue that there are 
periods of turbulences associated with a change in the leading sectors and/or the 
emergence of new sectors, which bring about a decline of technological and profit 
opportunities in established industries (Perez, 2002, 2009). This, in turn, could lead to 
a change in the knowledge and technological base relevant for business innovation, 
and could disturb the hierarchy of innovators. This thesis has been supported by 
Simonetti (1996), Louca and Mendonca (1999) and Freeman and Louca (2001), who 
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suggest that a stream of new firms join incumbent firms during periods of 
discontinuities. This proposition is in line with studies showing that firms’ 
organisational routines hamper the capacity of established firms to keep up with major 
discontinuities (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and 
March, 1993). 
Other arguments support the relevance of cumulativeness of knowledge and 
innovation; firms that innovated repeatedly in the past are those more likely to 
continue to innovate also in the present and in the future. One explanation highlights 
the learning process underneath innovation, which leads to path-dependency (e.g. 
Pavitt et al., 1989; Antonelli, 1997; Pavitt, 2005). Some studies indicate that there is 
some degree of persistence among innovators (Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001; Peters, 
2007) while others suggest that persistence is rather low (Geroski et al., 1997). This is 
also consistent with the fact that the number of large and incumbent firms remained 
relatively stable over several decades, as emphasised by Alfred Chandler (1977). 
Combining these facts with the empirical evidence that fewer firms invest in 
innovation during the crisis, we would expect that an economic downturn brings with 
it a greater concentration in innovation investment among fewer, highly innovative 
firms. Based on the latter arguments we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. During a crisis innovation investment concentrates further in those 
firms that were already highly innovative before the crisis 
 
If Hypothesis 1 is confirmed, it supports the idea that a crisis strengthens the patterns 
of accumulation at the firm-level. If Hypothesis 1 is contradicted, there will be some 
support for believing that a downturn encourages a process of creative destruction in 
the economy. 
 
2.2 Firm-level characteristics and persistent innovation 
The existing literature on persistence has identified the characteristics of innovating 
firms, but has not placed specific attention to economic cycles or to the size of the 
investment. The key findings of this literature relevant for our paper are that (a) 
persistence in innovation tends to be low (while persistence in non-innovation is 
high), and (b) persistence is strongest among ‘great innovators’ or firms that reach a 
specific threshold of innovation activities, identified, for example, by a large number 
of patents registered every year (e.g. Geroski et al., 1997; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001).  
Additionally, there is also evidence that persistence in R&D is strong 
(Antonelli et al., 2010; Latham and Le Bas, 2006), and that persistence in innovation 
outputs is more likely in terms of product innovations, while continuous process 
innovation is rare (Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2008). Further evidence, based on 
patent and survey data, also suggests that persistence in innovation occurs in the 
short-run, e.g. across two waves of innovation surveys, but that there is no evidence of 
persistence in the longer-run, i.e. across three or more waves of innovation surveys 
(Duguet and Monjon, 2004; Frenz and Prevezer, 2012). Raymond et al. (2010), in 
their analysis of four waves of the Dutch CIS, find persistence in high-tech industries 
but not among low-tech industries. 
In order to further explore Hypothesis 1, we have tried to identify a category 
of highly innovating firms. “Great innovators”, or those with a minimum threshold of 
innovation activities, are captured in Cefis (2003) as firms that have six or more 
patents. While Cefis’s empirical work suggests that great innovators are more likely to 
innovate persistently, Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2008) do not find higher 
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probabilities of innovation persistence among firms with high sales from innovation 
(their measure of comparatively greater innovativeness). We have singled out in our 
sample a category of “great innovators” that we define as all those firms that 
introduced “new-to-market product innovations”. We would expect that these firms 
increase their share of innovation expenditure as a consequence of a crisis. 
We combine the discussion on great innovators with another relevant strand of 
the literature on fast growing new entrants. There is theory and evidence that points 
towards the role of a relatively small group of new firms – perhaps those that from the 
outset of their establishment are comparatively large vis-à-vis less successful new 
firms – that survive (when survival rates are low) and that such firms sometimes turn 
into persistent innovators. In his study on industry demography, Audretsch (1997) 
observes that: (a) newly established firms are on average small with fewer than ten 
employees, and, thus, they are operating at suboptimal levels of output giving them a 
competitive disadvantage; and (b) if such new firms are successful in the market, they 
are very likely to rapidly expand and grow. We define new entrants as firms that were 
established after 1
st
 of January 2000. On the ground of this, we develop the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Increased investment in innovation during the crisis is more 
strongly correlated with two groups of firms – (a) those previously 
classified as great innovators and (b) those classified as fast 
growing new entrants 
 
Most empirical studies find support for an impact on (continuous) innovation of 
internal R&D, firm size and internal financial resources (e.g. Duguet and Monjon, 
2004; Antonelli et al., 2010). Specifically, because the current economic crisis has a 
financial origin, we want to explore if a lack of internal, financial resources hampered 
innovation during the crisis. In line with the empirical studies above, we expect that 
firms with strong internal resources are in a stronger position to continue investment 
in innovation. 
But, continuing to invest does not necessarily mean increasing your 
investment. It is possible, and likely, that the majority of large and incumbent firms, 
those with greater internal resources, continue or increase innovating with respect to 
some of their ongoing projects, but still might pause, abandon or postpone other 
projects, leading to an overall drop in innovation investment during the crisis as, for 
example, suggested by Kitching et al. (2009). Our data do not allow detecting if the 
same company is investing in some innovative projects while divesting in others (i.e. 
if the firm is shifting or narrowing the focus of its innovative activity). But, as 
captured by Hypothesis 1, we expect some form of concentration in innovation 
investment among the great innovators. On average, we expect that firms with larger 
internal resources would be able to invest relatively more in innovation during the 
crisis compared with firms with smaller internal resources. And, we would expect this 
patter to be strong during the crisis compared with before it. This is leading to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Increase in investment in innovation before and during the crisis is 
positively associated with internal R&D, firm size and firm 
internal financial resources 
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2.3 Innovation strategies during economic crises: a story of ambidexterity  
The argument that during the crisis firms might continue some innovation projects, 
while discontinuing other projects, is linked to the so-called ambidexterity in 
innovation strategies, to which we now turn. In a recent article, Kitching et al. (2009) 
suggest that economic crises spur change in investment strategies as a managerial 
response to the changes in the macro-environment. And, because innovation is risky 
as well as costly, during a crisis many firms might focus more strongly on survival, 
and less on seeking out new opportunities. A probable strategy is a combination of 
‘retrenchment and investment’ that involves seeking out new products or markets in 
certain areas, while engaging in cost cutting measures and activities aimed at 
increasing efficiency in other areas.  
 This trade-off between exploitation and exploration, or long-run and short-run 
strategies, was put forward by March (1991) who suggests that in order to survive 
firms need to maintain an appropriate balance between exploitation associated with 
cost cutting and exploration associated with new product or market development. 
Levinthal and March put it as follows: “the basic problem confronting an organization 
is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current viability and, at the same 
time, to devote enough energy to exploration to ensure its future viability” (1993, p. 
105).  
This balancing between exploitation and exploration is at the core of O’Really 
and Thusman’s (2004) conceptualisation of the ambidextrous organisation. The 
importance of a simultaneous exploitation and exploration strategy is also implicit in 
the concept of dynamic capabilities initially developed by Gary Pisano and David 
Teece (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997), and it also builds on argument 
that the ability of established firms to survive technological discontinuities depends on 
their broader knowledge base and that firms “know more than they do”, as suggested 
by Brusoni et al. (2001).  
Lathman (2009), contrasting the strategies of smaller start-ups with those of 
established software firms during the 2001-2003 economic downturn, finds evidence 
that size and age (experience) matters with respect to strategic response and that 
smaller and younger firms more strongly lean towards seeking new investment 
opportunities, while established firms tend to emphasis more strongly cost reducing 
strategies. We therefore test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4.  Firms that follow mixed strategies of exploitation and exploration – 
ambidextrous firms – are more likely to increase investment in 
innovation, and this positive relationship is of greater strength or 
relevance during the crisis compared with before 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 The UK Innovation Surveys 
We analyse the activities of just under 2,500 enterprises that responded to the latest 
three waves of the UK version of the CIS, in other words we analyse a balanced panel 
with observations at three points in time (T=3). For details on the net sample, see 
Appendix 1 on data sources. The latest available reference year is the calendar year 
2008, and this is when we measure our dependent variable: “change in innovation 
related expenditures during the crisis”. We compare this with “change in investment 
before the crisis” measured for the calendar year 2006.  
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CIS type data are widely used in academic papers concerned with explaining 
firms’ innovation activities and performances (e.g. Archibugi and Pianta, 1996; 
Smith, 2005; Mairesse and Mohen, 2008) and for the benchmarking of countries’ 
innovation outputs (Archibugi et al., 2009; European Commission, 2011). The 
majority of CIS based studies make use of one cross-section or unbalanced panels. 
Using a balanced panel makes it possible to compare the characteristics of those firms 
that increase innovation investment at two points: before the crisis in 2006 and during 
the crisis in 2008.  
The surveys have a set of disadvantages. While they offer breadth of 
information – in terms of the innovation related information/variables and coverage in 
terms of manufacturing and private services – the activities are self-reported. 
Responding enterprises might over-report their innovation activities. Further, the 
panel is biased towards large, established, and, because of this, also innovation active 
firms. Micro-firms, those with fewer than t employees, are not surveyed, neither are 
public services. Some of these shortcomings are mitigated by the fact that we do not 
seek to benchmark or report on levels of innovation performance in the UK before 
and during the crisis, but that we (a) look at changes in investment within the same 
firm over time and (b) compare the impact of different firm level characteristics on 
these changes. 
 
3.2 The variables 
Table 1 reports average innovation expenditures per employee and shows that there is 
a significant drop in innovation investment between the two periods. Innovation 
related investment, as defined by the surveys, includes in-house R&D expenditures, 
extramural R&D, other bought-in knowledge such as licensing, the acquisition of 
machinery and equipment, including computer hardware and software for innovation, 
expenditure on training and on the market launch of new products (goods and 
services).  
 
Table 1  Average innovation expenditures per employee in the UK, 2006 and 2008. 
 
Variables  N. of firms Mean Median  St. Dev. 
Total innovation expenditure per 
employee in 2006 in £000s 
2,479 2.44 0.25 10.82 
Total innovation expenditure per 
employee in 2008 in £000s 
2,485 2.04 0.06 9.63 
 
Source: UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS).  
 
UKIS2009, CIS6 for year 2008 and UKIS2007, CIS5 for year 2006. See Appendix for further details. 
Note: Firms that participated in the CIS surveys 2004, 2006 and 2008 have been considered. 
 
Average innovation investment per employee declined between 2006 and 2008 and 
became more concentrated among the higher investing firms (as shown by the larger 
difference between the mean and median in Table 1) in line with Hypothesis 1.  
To test our hypotheses using regressions we require a measure of the change 
in innovation related investment during and before the crisis. This forms our two 
dependent variables. Values for innovation related investment are available in the 
balanced panel for the calendar years 2004, 2006 and 2008. We compute the change 
in 2008 compared with 2006 and use this as the change in innovation expenditure 
during the crisis. Before the crisis is the change in innovation investment in 2006 
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compared with 2004. The final variable used in the regressions is log transformed. 
Table 2 provides a full description of our variables – dependent, independent and 
control variables – and indicates their link with our hypotheses.  
 
Table 2  Description of the variables and their link to research hypothesis 
 
 Variable Name Description Hypothesis 
1 Log change in 
innovation 
expenditure in 
2006 and 2008 
Log of innovation related 
investment compared to previous 
period 
Dependent variable 
2 Log total 
innovation 
expenditure in 
2004 and 2006 
Log of innovation expenditure in 
the previous period 
Control variable 
3 Great 
innovators in 
2004 
Dummy variable. Great innovators 
are enterprises that introduced 
new-to-the-market goods and 
services in 2004 
Testing H1 and H2 -  Great 
innovators increase innovation 
expenditure during the crisis 
4 Newly 
established 
2000 
Dummy variable. Enterprises 
established between 2000 and 
2004, value 1, others 0 
Control variable 
5 Growth of 
newly 
established 
firms in 2006 
and 2008 
Log of the change in turnover 
compared to previous period for 
new firms as defined in (4). This 
variable takes a value of zero for 
firms established before 2000 
Testing H2 – Fast growing new 
enterprises increase innovation 
expenditure during the crisis 
6 Internal R&D 
in 2004 and 
2006 
Dummy variable. Enterprises with 
internal R&D expenditure in the 
previous period, value 1, others 0 
Testing H3 – Enterprises with 
internal R&D increase 
innovation expenditure during 
the crisis 
7 Log employees 
in 2004 and 
2006 
Size of the firm according to the 
number of employees in the 
previous period 
Testing H3 – Large enterprises 
increase innovation 
expenditure during the crisis 
8 Availability of 
finance in 2004 
and 2006 
Dummy variable. Firms which 
gave in the previous period 
medium or high importance to the 
availability of finance as 
innovation obstacle, value 1, firms 
that gave no or low importance, 
value 0 
Testing H3 – Enterprises with 
internal financial resources 
increase innovation 
expenditure during the crisis 
9 Log sales per 
employee in 
2004 and 2006 
Log of sales per employee in the 
previous period 
Testing H3 – Enterprises with 
higher sales per employee (as 
proxy of available internal 
resources) increase innovation 
expenditure during the crisis 
10 Exploration in 
2006 and 2008 
Dummy variable. Firms in the 
upper two quartiles in the sum of 
the scores across four-point likert 
scales in the question: “how 
important were each of the 
following factors in your decision 
to innovate: (i) increase range of 
goods or services; (ii) entering new 
Control variable 
11 
 
markets or increased market 
share”, value 1, others  0. 
11 Exploitation in 
2006 and 2008 
 Dummy variable. Firms in the 
upper to quartiles in the sum of the 
scores across four-point likert 
scales in the question:  “ how 
important were each of the 
following factors in your decision 
to innovate: (i) improving quality 
of goods or services; (ii) improving 
flexibility for producing goods or 
services; (iii) increasing capacity 
for producing goods or services; 
(iv) reducing costs per unit 
produced 
Control variable 
12 Ambidexterity 
in 2006 and 
2008 
Dummy variable. A firm is in the 
upper quartiles with respect to both 
- exploration and exploitation (see 
11 and 12), value 1, others 0 
Testing H4 – Enterprises that 
follow mixed strategies of 
exploitation and exploration – 
ambidextrous enterprises, 
increase innovation expenditure 
during the crisis 
13 IPRs in 2004 
and 2006 
Dummy variable. Firms that 
declared to use IPR protection in 
the previous period, value 1, others 
0 
Control variable 
14 Skills in 2006 
and 2008 
Log of the proportion of 
employees that hold a degree at 
BA/BSc level or above.  
Control variable 
15 International 
markets in 2006 
and 2008 
Dummy variable. Enterprises that 
operate outside the UK, value 1, 
others 0 
Control variable 
Data source: UK Innovation Surveys 2005, 2007 and 2009, UK version of the CIS4, 5 and 6. See 
Appendix for further details. 
 
In the regressions we include as our first independent variable a control for the level 
of innovation expenditure in the previous period, i.e. for the change in innovation 
expenditures in 2006, we include the level of expenditure in 2004, and for the change 
in 2008, we include the level of innovation expenditure in 2006. We take logs of the 
level of innovation expenditures in 2006 and 2008 to normalise the data.  
To test our Hypotheses 1 and 2 we include a variable that selects our ‘great 
innovators’. This variable is measured on a binary scale and selects all firms with 
sales from new-to-market products (goods and services) in 2004. The next variable, a 
control variable, selects all enterprises that were newly established between January 
2000 and December 2004. The third independent variable is the product of the former 
variable ‘newly established’ and the change in turnover in 2006 and 2008 
respectively. These variables are used to test if newly established and fast growing 
firms are more likely to increase investment during the crisis, as proposed by 
Hypothesis 2.  
Among the variables looking at firm level heterogeneity, and designed to test 
Hypothesis 3, are: a dummy variable that takes values of one if an enterprises reported 
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in-house R&D, the log of the number of employees, a dummy that selects enterprises 
who reported as a constraint to innovation the (lack of) availability of finance and the 
log of turnover per employee. The latter is used as a proxy for the internal resources 
of firms. All these independent variables are captured with a time lead, i.e. they are 
measured in 2004 to predict change in innovation related investment in 2006, and are 
measured in 2006 to predict change in innovation related investment in 2008. Further, 
we include a control dummy that takes a value of one if the enterprise used IPRs and 
zero otherwise, 
To examine Hypothesis 4 three variables are constructed. In order to identify 
the two strategies – exploration and exploitation – we use a set of CIS questions about 
the importance of different factors for the decision to innovation caputred on a four-
point likert scale (3=high importance, 2=medium importance, 1=low importance, 
0=not applicable). For exploration we sum across two factors/variables: to increase 
range of products; and to enter new markets or increase market share. For exploitation 
we use four questions: to improve quality of products; to improve production 
flexibility; to increase capacity for production; and to reduce costs per unit. The 
grouping of variables into consistent subsets indicative of exploration and exploitation 
is confirmatory factor analysis. We select the upper quantile (k=2) to identify firms 
with exploitation and exploration strategies. Further, we say that a firm is 
ambidextrous when both exploration and exploitation are high (i.e. the firm falls 
within the upper quantile on both variables). Similar constructs are developed in the 
literature (see, for example, He and Wong, 2004). The variables are not lagged as we 
are concerned with the dynamics of the exploitation/exploration activity during the 
crisis when compared with before the crisis. 
Finally, we include the following classic control variables: (a) the share of 
employees that are educated to degree level; (b) whether or not an enterprise operated 
in international markets; and (c) 2-digit industry dummies. The results from the 
industry dummies are omitted from our presentations but can be made available upon 
request from the authors.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
We use regression methods to test our hypotheses. We report a Heckman model that 
corrects for a bias that arises because of an enterprise’s decision to invest (or not) in 
innovation. The selection equation, investing or not in innovation, uses the following 
three explanatory variables, next to industry dummies which are also included: (a) an 
enterprise perceived no need to innovate due to market conditions, (b) due to previous 
innovations, (c) due to other factors constraining innovation. We compute robust 
standard errors. The results of the selection equations are not presented. Further, we 
compute truncated OLS regressions (OLS based on the firms investing in innovation 
using the same independent variables as feed into the ultimate Heckman equation) 
with robust standard errors.  OLS coefficients are less prone to errors in variables. The 
results across the two estimation techniques are almost identical, reporting the same 
significance levels and effect sizes. They are not reported here, but can be made 
available upon request.  
Our dependent variables – change in total innovation expenditure in 2006 and 
2008 – are regressed against the set of independent variables and control variables that 
we introduced in Table 2 above. The structural independent variables lead by one 
period (i.e. a two year gap), when we are interested in the inter-temporal nature of the 
innovation behaviour of the firm. The time lags can also, at least to some extent, 
mitigate issues of endogeneity. With three time periods and a control for levels of 
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innovation investment in the previous period it is not possible to use panel techniques, 
such as fixed effects regressions.  
We report the full model, as well as alternative models omitting specific 
variables one at a time (e.g. exploitation, exploration and ambidexterity are entered 
together, but we also compute two models, one using exploitation and exploration, 
and one using the ambidexterity variable). The summary statistics of our variables – 
mean and standard deviation – are presented in Table 3 with the zero-order 
correlations among variables reported in Appendix 2.  
 
Table 3.  Firms innovation behaviour in the UK, 2006 and 2008. Dependent and independent variables 
 
  Before the crisis           During the crisis       
    N. of 
firms 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
     N. of 
firms 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 Dependent Variable      Dependent Variable    
1 Log change in innovation exp. 
2006 
2,485 0.20 2.58  1 Log change in innovation exp. 
2008 
2,485 -0.61 2.58 
 Independent Variables      Independent Variables    
2 Log total innovation exp. 2004 2,485 2.73 2.63  2 Log total innovation exp. 2006 2,485 2.92 2.57 
3 Great innovators 2004 2,485 0.13 0.34  3 Great innovators 2004 2,485 0.13 0.34 
4 Newly established 2000 2,478 0.11 0.31  4 Newly established 2000 2,478 0.11 0.31 
5 Growth of newly established 
firms in 2006 
2,478 0.02 0.27  5 Growth of newly established 
firms in 2008 
2,478 0.01 0.25 
6 Internal R&D 2004 2,484 0.34 0.47  6 Internal R&D 2006 2,484 0.29 0.46 
7 Log employees 2004 2,446 4.23 1.48  7 Log employees 2006 2,479 4.32 1.51 
8 Availability of finance 2004 2,480 0.23 0.42  8 Availability of finance 2006 2,469 0.17 0.38 
9 Log sales per emp. 2004 2,446 4.26 1.07  9 Log sales per emp. 2006 2,479 4.29 1.08 
10 Exploration 2006 2,485 0.31 0.61  10 Exploration 2008 2,485 0.62 0.79 
11 Exploitation 2006 2,485 0.34 0.67  11 Exploitation 2008 2,485 0.63 0.80 
12 Ambidexterity 2006 2,485 0.05 0.21  12 Ambidexterity 2008 2,485 0.13 0.33 
13 IPRs 2004 2,481 0.32 0.47  13 IPRs 2006 2,420 0.36 0.48 
14 Skills 2006 2,061 1.74 1.49  14 Skills 2008 2,484 1.49 1.39 
15 International markets 2006 2,482 0.39 0.49   15 International markets 2008 2,482 0.39 0.49 
 
Source: as for Table 1.  
Legend: For explanation of variables see Table 2. 
4. Results 
 
In this section we discuss our results in connection with Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4. As 
reported before in Table 1, the crisis has a considerable impact on innovation 
investment. Innovation expenditure declined and is more concentrated. To test 
Hypothesis 1 we designed a variable selecting a group of ‘great innovators’ defined 
by positive new-to-market sales in goods or services. Our measure, as opposed to 
other measures used in the literature to identify great innovators such as ‘patent 
intensity’, is more likely to also capture strong innovators among smaller enterprises 
less likely to patent. Smaller firms play a role in some very innovative sectors such as 
biotech and ICTs. Additionally, and compared with patent data, this type of measure 
avoids differences in the patenting intensity across industries, and the bias of the 
manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the service sector. This is specifically relevant in an 
economy with a comparatively larger services sector. Thirteen percent of the 
enterprises in our dataset are classed as great innovators. Table 4 reports the 
characteristics of the great innovators compared with the remaining enterprises.  
 
Table 4  Innovation expenditure of great innovators and other firms, 2006 and 2008 
 
  Great 
innovators 
All other 
firms 
Total 
No. of firms 324 2,161 2,485 
Percent 13 87 100 
Share of innovation exp. 2006 0.21 0.79 1 
Share of innovation exp. 2008 0.37 0.63 1 
Average innovation exp. 2006 in £000s 981 563 618 
Average innovation exp. 2008 in £000s 1,599 413 568 
Change in average innovation exp. 2006-2008  0.63 -0.27 -0.08 
 
Source: As for Table 1. 
Legend: Share of innovation expenditure of great innovators and of other firms. 
Great innovators are firms that introduced new-to-the-market goods and services in 2004. 
 
Before the crisis the group of great innovators account for 21 percent of total 
innovation expenditures, while this share increases to 37 percent during the crisis. 
This pattern is also reflected in the average innovation expenditure which between 
2006 and 2008 is up from £981,000 to £1,599,000. By contrast, the average 
innovation expenditure of the remaining enterprises drops from £563,000 before the 
crisis to £413,000 during the crisis. These summary statistics reported in Table 4 are 
in line with the creative accumulation story picked up in Hypothesis 1. We now turn 
to the regressions results presented in Table 5 below to explore the full set of 
hypotheses. 
  
Table 5 Innovation behaviour before and during the crisis. Regression results 
 
1 Change in innov. exp. t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    Before the crisis (2006) 
2 Level of innov. exp. t-1 -0.92** -0.92** -0.92** -0.92** -0.92** -0.91** 
  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
3 Great Innovators 2004 0.02 0.03 
  
0.01 0.14 
  
(0.132) (0.132) 
  
(0.133) (0.139) 
4 Newly established 2000 -0.24 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.25 -0.27+ 
  
(0.152) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.152) (0.161) 
5 Fast grow. new firms t 0.31 
  
0.23 0.32 0.36 
  
(0.287) 
  
(0.261) (0.289) (0.304) 
6 In-house R&D t-1 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.04 
  
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.123) 
7 Log employees t-1 0.51** 0.52** 0.51** 0.51** 0.51** 0.54** 
  
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
8 Availability finance t-1 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 
  
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.110) 
9 Sales per employee t-1 0.40** 0.39** 0.39** 0.40** 0.40** 0.43** 
  
(0.061) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) 
10 Explorative strategy t 0.32* 0.33* 0.33* 0.33* 0.27* 
 
  
(0.140) (0.140) (0.141) (0.140) (0.128) 
 11 Exploitative strategy t 0.62** 0.61** 0.62** 0.61** 0.62** 
 
  
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
 12 Ambidexterity t -0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 
 
1.08** 
  
(0.198) (0.197) (0.198) (0.197) 
 
(0.152) 
13 IPRs t-1 0.19+ 0.18 0.19+ 0.19+ 0.19+ 0.25* 
  
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114) 
14 Skills t 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.27** 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
15 International market t 0.28* 0.29** 0.29* 0.29* 0.28* 0.31** 
  
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) 
 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Constant -1.24 -1.28 -1.20 -1.31 -1.22 -1.07 
 
N. of firms 2,112 2,117 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 
 
Censored observations 393 393 393 393 393 393 
 
Rho -0.71** -0.71** -0.70** -0.71** -0.71** -1.07** 
 Chi-squared (d.f.) 1,657(31)** 1,674(29)** 1,651(29)** 1,650(29)** 1,719(30)** 1,577(29)** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Source: As for Table 1. Legend: For explanations of independent variables see Table 2. 
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Table 5 Innovation behaviour before and during the crisis. Regression results cont.  
 
1 Change in innov. exp. t (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
    During the crisis (2008) 
2 Level of innov. exp. t-1 -0.93** -0.93** -0.92** -0.93** -0.93** -0.92** 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
3 Great Innovators 2004 0.40** 0.40** 
  
0.39** 0.54** 
  
(0.140) (0.140) 
  
(0.140) (0.143) 
4 Newly established 2000 -0.20 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.21 -0.28* 
  
(0.131) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.131) (0.137) 
5 Fast grow. new firms t 0.58** 
  
0.58** 0.59** 0.62** 
  
(0.185) 
  
(0.179) (0.187) (0.183) 
6 In-house R&D t-1 0.51** 0.50** 0.55** 0.56** 0.50** 0.61** 
  
(0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.129) 
7 Log employees t-1 0.36** 0.35** 0.35** 0.35** 0.36** 0.39** 
  
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) 
8 Availability finance t-1 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 
  
(0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) 
9 Sales per employee t-1 0.29** 0.27** 0.27** 0.30** 0.29** 0.31** 
  
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.067) 
10 Explorative strategy t 0.59** 0.58** 0.61** 0.62** 0.54** 
 
  
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
 11 Exploitative strategy t 0.39** 0.40** 0.39** 0.38** 0.34** 
 
  
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.114) 
 12 Ambidexterity t -0.33+ -0.35* -0.32+ -0.32+ 
 
0.93** 
  
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.177) 
 
(0.148) 
13 IPRs t-1 0.28* 0.29** 0.31** 0.31** 0.28* 0.29* 
  
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) 
14 Skills t 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.22** 
  
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
15 International market t 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.17 
  
(0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.117) 
 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
Constant -0.80 -0.73 -0.68 -0.84 -0.70 -0.12 
 
N. of firms 2,420 2,425 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 
 
Censored observations 391 391 391 391 391 391 
 
Rho -0.18 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 -0.22 -0.56** 
 Chi-squared (d.f.) 1,141(31)** 1,137(29)** 1,122(29)** 1,127(29)** 1,131(30)** 982(29)** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Source: As for Table 1. Legend: For explanations of independent variables see Table 2.
For Hypothesis 2 the relevant coefficients are those derived from the dummy variable 
‘great innovators’ and the continuous variable ‘fast growing new firms’.4 Before the 
crisis, the coefficients for the variables great innovators and fast growing new firms 
are non-significant. In contrast, during the crisis the same coefficients are positive and 
significant (p<0.01). This supports Hypothesis 2 according to which during the crisis 
great innovators and fast growing new firms are more strongly correlated with 
increased innovation investment compared with before the crisis. We also test the 
behaviour of all new firms irrespectively of their turnover growth in 2006 and 2008. 
We find that in both during as well as before the crisis, the relevant coefficients – 
albeit insignificant – are negative. 
We now turn to Hypothesis 3. The size of the firm – measured by the log of 
the number of employees – shows an interesting pattern. The coefficient is positive 
and significant both before and during the crisis. However, it seems to play a more 
important role before the crisis (b=0.51; p<0.01) when compared with during the 
crisis (b= 0.36; p<0.01). The second variable of interest, in-house R&D activity, 
produces results consistent with Hypothesis 3. The coefficient for in-house R&D is 
non-significant before the crisis, while it is positive and significant during the crisis. 
The non-significant coefficient before the crisis might be linked to the industry 
dummies included in all models and that might capture some element of R&D 
intensity. Or be linked to the fact that well over half of our sample contains 
enterprises whose main activities are in the services sector, the majority of which will 
not have traditional R&D activities (e.g. the large retails sector). The pattern that 
arises during the crisis suggests that internal R&D plays an important role during the 
crisis. This might be explained as follows: firms that commit to R&D in the form of 
personnel and labs are unlikely to change tact swiftly.  
In order to explore the role of internal financial resources in affecting the 
innovation expenditure of the firm we consider two variables. The first – availability 
of finance – is related to the set of questions in the CIS questionnaire which addresses 
the obstacles to innovation activity. The second – sales per employee – is instead a 
measure of economic performance of the firm. While the former variable is not 
significant in the two periods, the pattern of the latter suggests a less important role of 
the availability of internal resources during the crisis when compared with before the 
crisis. With respect to the former variable, it is a well known fact that the constraints 
to innovate questions tend to produce endogenous results – with highly innovative 
firms assessing obstacles as strong – and less innovative firms self-reporting or 
perceiving obstacles as less strong.  
The last hypothesis – Hypothesis 4 – picks up on the ambidexterity arguments 
discussed in Section 2. Interestingly, our results suggest that explorative strategies – 
positive and significant both before and during the crisis – have a larger size effect 
during the crisis (b=0.59; p<0.01 during the crisis compared with b=0.32; p<0.05 
before the crisis). The reverse is the case for exploitation strategies that appear to 
matter more before the crisis (0.62; p<0.01) than during the crisis (b=0.39; p<0.01).  
The results for ambidexterity are mixed. Ambidexterity is positively associated 
to higher increase in innovation investment before the crisis (b=1.08; p<0.01) and 
during the crisis (b=0.93; p<0.01), but only in the models that omit the variables for 
exploitation and exploration strategies (Columns 6 and 12 in Table 5). Ambidexterity 
is the interaction term between our variables exploitation and exploration introducing 
                                                 
4
 The variable ‘fast growing new entrants’ is captured by the product of the dummy variable ‘newly 
established’ and the change in turnover in 2006 and 2008 respectively. In other words, the variables 
give the rate of growth of the new firms in 2006 and 2008 and a value of zero for all established firms. 
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some element of multicolinearity. Nonetheless, the negative coefficient, that becomes 
marginally significant during the crisis (b=0.33; p<0.1, see Column 7 of Table 5) 
would imply some negative support for Hypothesis 4.  
We computed the regressions presented in Table 5 also for two subsets of 
enterprises: services and manufacturing separately. Because the results on these two 
subsets are similar, and do not impact on the conclusions that we draw based on the 
results of the full sample, we omitted these results. 
A last comment relates to the coefficients of our industry dummies. These are 
largely not significant. This can have two reasons. First, the enterprise/firm-level 
variables are more relevant in explaining change in innovation investment. Second, 
the industry dummies are too broad and do not usefully map against technological 
regimes at least with respect to some of sectors that we control for.  
 
 
5. Discussion  
 
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether the current economic downturn is 
significantly affecting the behaviour of innovating firms. During major recessions, the 
economic landscape is characterized by huge uncertainties about the direction of 
technological change, demand conditions, and new market opportunities. The first 
significant result at the aggregate level is that the crisis has substantially reduced 
innovation expenditure of the firm. On average, firms in our sample reduce innovation 
expenditure in 2008 by 8 percent compared to 2006. No doubt that the crisis has 
brought, at least in its initial stage, “destruction” in the amount of resources devoted 
to innovation. The second major aggregate result is that innovation expenditure 
started to be more concentrated: fewer firms are responsible for an increased share of 
innovation expenditure. 
We used two well-established, ideal typical models – the creative destruction 
and creative accumulation – to frame our results. It has been assumed a clear-cut 
division according to which in regular times the model of creative accumulation 
would prevail while in times of crisis the model of creative destruction will affirm 
itself. We are well aware that a clear-cut division between the two models does not 
exist. Employing a panel dataset spanning the period 2004 to 2008 we were able to 
explore to what extent the innovators during the crisis are also those who were 
innovating before, or they are new innovators which are taking advantage of the 
peculiar environment of a major economic downturn. Our evidence strongly supports 
the case for creative accumulation. Those firms identified as the great innovators in 
2004, are responsible for a larger share of innovation expenditure in 2008 compared 
to 2006. It should also be noted that the great innovators do not stand as increasing 
innovation before the crisis, in 2006. That is, being a great innovator does not predict 
increase in innovation investment before the crisis, but it does during the crisis. Put 
differently, the cumulative, or persistent, nature of innovation activity tends to be 
more prominent in times of crisis compared to during ordinary times. 
But does it mean that the crisis is exacerbating the concentration of innovation 
in a few firms, thus leaving a few hopes for dynamic Schumpeterian entrepreneurs? In 
fact, alongside the great innovators there is another category of firms which is gaining 
momentum during the crisis by increasing innovation expenditure. They are the fast 
growing new firms. The latter are firms established between 2000 and 2004 coupled 
with a faster rate of turnover growth. As great innovators, this group of firms does not 
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show an above average behaviour in 2006 but it starts to increase expenditure during 
the crisis.  
We then asked how the innovators look like during the crisis. Particularly, 
drawing from the research on innovation persistence we investigated those 
characteristics of the firm which make the firm more likely to keep on innovating, and 
we applied this framework to the context of the crisis. Similarly to previous studies, 
we find that size, economic performance, and an exploitation strategy predict 
increased innovation investment before the crisis. However, when we turn to what 
happened during the crisis we find interesting differences. Both size and economic 
performance play a less important role. By contrast, the presence of in-house R&D 
activity becomes a major predictor of increase in innovation expenditure during the 
crisis. As for the firm’s strategy, pursuing an explorative strategy (including looking 
into new markets), becomes relatively more important. This evidence suggests that 
during the current crisis the sources of persistence in innovation are fundamentally 
two. In the first place, the existence of an R&D department suggests the firm has 
made a medium or long-term committed to innovation. Secondly, we show the 
important contribution of a strategy, and in particular of a strategy aimed at exploring 
new markets and new product developments. 
Identifying the characteristics of the innovators during the turmoil, as we have 
tried to do here, can shed some light on how policy instruments interact with 
technological accumulation and creative destruction. There is little doubt that the old 
innovators are taking advantage of the turbulent environment to gain momentum. 
However, the picture is made more complicated by the presence of new entrants who 
have been growing fast. Our evidence is thus consistent with an innovation 
environment characterized by the presence of both Mark II types of innovators and 
Mark I types of innovators. This bears some implications for policy. 
On the one hand, policies should support the good innovators, rewarding the 
winners. On the other hand, policies should also encourage the creation of new 
innovative firms. It is certainly not easy for policy makers to recognize which of the 
new firms are more likely to be successful and the fact that they are relatively young 
makes this task even harder. Our data suggests that size alone could not be enough to 
indicate if a firm will be successful. Other structural characteristics, such as the 
presence of an R&D department and its past economic performance, seem to play a 
more important role.  
We conclude by pointing out some limitations of the study. The analysis 
presented here is limited by the data and the statistical models. First, the results are 
confined to the UK, and it will be important to see if they are confirmed for the rest of 
Europe, the United States as well as emerging countries. Second, data do not allow 
singling out the dynamics at the industry level. Finally, we could not look at the firms 
established during the crisis. Perhaps the Bill Gates, Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg 
of the future are already at work. It would certainly not be the first time that 
innovation surprises us. 
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Appendix 1 – Data sources 
 
In the paper we have used the UK version of the Community Innovation Survey carried 
out by the Office for National Statistics on behalf of the UK Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills – Science and Innovation Analysis unit (which was until 2009 
part of the former Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, and until 2007 
part of the former Department of Trade and Industry). We have used three waves of the 
survey collected in 2005, 2007 and 2009, and that are the UK versions of CIS4, 5 and 6. 
The reference period of the surveys is (a) the three year period ending in the year before 
data collection or (b) for quantitative variables including innovation expenditures, 
turnover or employment figures the last calendar year before data collection, these are 
the years 2004, 2006 and 2008.  Questionnaires for each CIS wave can be consulted on-
line at http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/science/science-innovation-analysis/cis. 
 
Only firms that responded to the three periods have been considered, allowing us to 
consider panel data. The initial panel contained responses from 4,054 enterprises. These 
are reduced in our analysis to 2,420 and 2,112 enterprises during and before the crisis 
respectively. This drop in observations is due to missing values. In particular there are 
missing values in the turnover variables – 406 missing observations in 2004, 255 
missing observations in 2006, and 535 missing observations in 2008 – and in the 
employment variables – 379 missing values in 2004, 257 missing values in 2006, and 
528 missing values in 2008. There are also 720 missing observations in the innovation 
expenditure variable in CIS5. Because these missing values do not necessarily affect the 
same enterprise in all three waves, but can originate from different enterprises, this 
effect – reduction in the number of observations – is compounded.  
 
For a detailed analysis of the survey, including the panel used in this paper, see the 
following references: Robson and Kenchatt (2010) and the UK Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (2010). 
 
We wish to thank Professor Keith Smith, Dr Ray Lambert and Ms Stephanie Robson for 
their kind assistance in accessing the data of the innovation surveys. 
 
Appendix 2 - Zero-order correlations among the variables 
 
Before the crisis (t as per regression) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Change in innovation exp. 2006 1.00 
            
  
2 Log total innovation exp. 2004 -0.52 1.00 
           
  
3 Great innovators 2004 -0.09 0.28 1.00 
          
  
4 Newly established 2000 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 1.00 
         
  
5 Growth of newly established firms in 2006 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.25 1.00 
        
  
6 Internal R&D 2004 -0.16 0.49 0.32 0.01 -0.05 1.00 
       
  
7 Log employees 2004 0.02 0.34 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.11 1.00 
      
  
8 IPRs 2004 -0.06 0.38 0.26 -0.03 -0.03 0.37 0.21 1.00 
     
  
9 Availability of finance 2004 -0.10 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.11 -0.02 0.19 1.00 
    
  
10 Log sales per emp. 2004 0.01 0.22 0.07 -0.12 -0.14 0.08 -0.01 0.14 -0.04 1.00 
   
  
11 Exploration 2006 0.09 0.33 0.27 -0.02 -0.02 0.34 0.11 0.27 0.07 0.08 1.00 
  
  
12 Exploitation 2006 0.10 0.34 0.25 -0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.13 0.26 0.08 0.09 0.88 1.00 
 
  
13 Ambidexterity 2006 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.02 -0.02 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.62 0.55 1.00   
14 Skills 2006 0.02 0.30 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.25 0.18 0.27 0.08 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.10 1.00 
15 International markets 2006 0.03 0.26 0.22 -0.05 -0.03 0.29 0.10 0.32 0.06 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.27 
 
During the crisis (t as per regression) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Change in innovation exp. 2008 1.00 
            
  
2 Log total innovation exp. 2006 -0.50 1.00 
           
  
3 Great innovators 2004 0.05 0.20 1.00 
          
  
4 Newly established 2000 0.00 -0.07 0.00 1.00 
         
  
5 Growth of newly established firms in 2008 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.14 1.00 
        
  
6 Internal R&D 2006 -0.09 0.49 0.30 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 
       
  
7 Log employees 2006 -0.10 0.38 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 1.00 
      
  
8 IPRs 2006 -0.07 0.40 0.23 -0.04 -0.01 0.37 0.20 1.00 
     
  
9 Availability of finance 2006 -0.03 0.17 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.22 1.00 
    
  
10 Log sales per emp. 2006 -0.05 0.24 0.07 -0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.03 0.12 0.00 1.00 
   
  
11 Exploration 2008 0.13 0.34 0.28 -0.04 -0.03 0.37 0.11 0.26 0.14 0.09 1.00 
  
  
12 Exploitation 2008 0.11 0.34 0.24 -0.04 -0.02 0.36 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.09 0.87 1.00 
 
  
13 Ambidexterity 2008 0.06 0.26 0.23 0.00 -0.03 0.31 0.07 0.20 0.12 0.07 0.67 0.66 1.00   
14 Skills 2008 -0.01 0.33 0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.28 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.17 1.00 
15 International markets 2008 -0.01 0.30 0.22 -0.06 0.00 0.33 0.08 0.31 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.27 
 
